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IN THE SUPREME COURT or THE STATE Or UTAH
McKAY DEE HOSPITAL,
Plaintiff,

vs.

Case Ro. 11182

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH and TED CLARK SPACKMAN,
Defendants.
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF

JOSEPH C. RUST
KIRTON ' McCONKIB
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
FRANK V. NELSON
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendants
Industrial Commission
and Ted Clark Spackman
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Plaintiff wishes to reply to the defendants' brief
in the following respects:

Point I
Defendant Spackman's Injury was Self-Inflicted Plowing
Naturally from the Defendant's Intentional Act of
Slamming his Fist Against a Metal Door in a rlt of Rage
In the defendants' brief counsel states, •The act
of the employee, in hitting the door with his fist, was an
intentional and purposeful act.R

(Defendants' Brief, p.J.)

Admitting this, counsel, however, goes on to say that, •The
act was intended but not the injury.R

(Defendants' Brief,

p.3.) In this way counsel for the defendants would suggest
that the employee's injury was not self-inflicted and
therefore compensable.
u.c.A.

(1953) Section 35-1-45 clearly provides

that an employee's loss or injury shall be compensable,
• provided the same was not purposely selfinflicted . .

The loss and injury suffered by the

defendant in this case were self-inflicted, flowing
naturally from the claimant's act of slamming his fist
against a metal door in a fit of rage.

To separate

Spackman's intentional act from the consequences of that act
under the facts of this case would be to torture the common
a~d

reasonable interpretation of this statute.

The

consequences of the said defendant's act were natural,
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•bould be held to have purposely inflicted injury upon
hla•elf thereby making him ineligible for compensation.
Counsel for the defendants cites the rule that
negligence alone will not prevent compensation.

Twin Peaks

Co. v. Ind. Comm. of Utah, 57 U.S89, 196 P. 853 (1921).
Plaintiff has no argument with the rule.

The facts of the

in•tant case, however, indicate that the defendant Spackman
intentionally, as opposed to negligently, slammed his fist
against a metal door, thereby inflicting injury upon
himself.
Counsel for the defendants would distinguish a
purposeful self-infliction of injury from a foolish or
negligent act; admitting that compensation should be denied
for self-infliction but allowed for a foolish act.
Defendants' Brief, p.3).

(See

As noted earlier, the facts of

this case present no negligence issues.

Moreover, the case

of Carland v. Vance, 137 Pa. Super. 47, 10 A.2d 114 (1939),
cited by defendants as support for their position, in
reality supports the plaintiff's position herein.

The court

in that case specifically labeled the claimant's act of
striking a match to his gas saturated pants, "on a dare," as
a •foolish act•.

In that case the court denied compensation

on the basis that the injury was self-inflicted and was no
accident.

10 A.2d at 115.
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Point II
Defendant Spackman's Injury Did Not Arise Out of
or in the Course of Employment
Under Point II of defendants' brief, counsel
points out that, •utah is the only state according to Larson
which uses the more broad language of 'arising out of
the course of employment.••
6).

~in

(See Defendants' Brief, pp. 5-

Although most state's statutes require that the injury

arise out of and in the course of employment, the
distinction seems to be unimportant.

In M ' K Corp• v.

Ind. Comm., 112 u. 488, 189 P.2d 132 (1948), this court
interpreted "arising out of or in the course of employ.ent•
as follows:
The accident (must) arise • • • while the
employee is rendering service to his employer
which he was hired to do, or doing something
incidental thereto, at the time when and the
place where he was authorized to render such
service.
189 P.2d at 134.
Thus, it is clear that to be eligible for
compensation the defendant-claimant must show that his
injury occurred while he was rendering a service for which
he was employed or doing something incidental thereto.
Clearly the defendant was not hired to smash his fist into a
door.
In Hafer's Inc. v. Ind. Comm. of Utah, 526 P.2d
1188 (Utah 1974), this Court explains what is meant by
"incidental thereto":
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The scope of one's employment includes not
only those things which are the direct and
priaary duties of the assigned job (that
which he is hired to do); but also those
things which are reasonably necessary and
incidental thereto.
526 P.2d at 1189.

(Emphasis added.)

The defendant's act of slamming his fist into a
door in a fit of rage cannot be termed •reasonably
necessary• to the fulfillment of the duties which he was
hired to perform.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff prays that the award be
reversed and the defendant's claim for compensation be
denied.
pectfully submitted,

.';~Rus~
~
RT~~f~ ~cCONKIE
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